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Abstract
This paper documents order submission strategies during the Toronto Stock Exchange’s
pre-opening session. I ﬁnd that the registered trader (RT) actively participates in the mar-
ket opening despite not being able to set the opening price directly and not having an
apparent informational advantage. I ﬁnd that RT opening trades are proﬁtable, are able
to moderate overnight price changes, and may be motivated, in part, by inventory adjust-
ment concerns. I focus on interlisted stocks that simultaneously open for trading under
two different mechanisms and show how the comparative levels of pre-trade market trans-
parency of each exchange impacts RT proﬁts and participation.
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An emerging topic in ﬁnancial market microstructure is the role of pre-opening sessions and of
opening protocols in facilitating price discovery. Financial markets have established a variety
of opening protocols designed to incorporate new information efﬁciently into security prices
after the overnight non-trading period. Recent articles by Biais, et al. (1999), Madhavan and
Panchapagesan (2000), and Cao, et al. (2000) have explored price discovery during the pre-
opening of the Paris Bourse, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Nasdaq Stock
Market, respectively. This paper extends this line of research by focusing on the pre-opening
session and the market opening of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).
The role of the TSE’s designated market maker, the responsible registered trader (RRT), at
the market opening is ambiguous. Unlike the NYSE specialist, the RRT cannot set the open-
ing price directly and, because of the high level of pre-trade market transparency on the TSE,
the RRT does not have an apparent informational advantage at the market opening. Thus,
it is unclear whether the RRT is able to improve upon the efﬁciency of a transparent, purely
automated opening mechanism such as the pre-opening session of the Paris Bourse. The ob-
jective of this paper is to investigate the RRT’s motivation for submitting orders during the
pre-opening session and to determine how these orders impact liquidity and price discovery.
This research is timely because of two trends in ﬁnancial markets: (i) the development of
around-the-clock trading; and (ii) the increase in market fragmentation resulting from new
alternative trading venues. At ﬁrst glance, the trend towards around-the-clock trading ap-
pears to make market opening mechanisms obsolete. However, as initial attempts to intro-
duce after-hours trading have demonstrated, trading outside of regular trading hours can
be subject to very poor liquidity and signiﬁcant price volatility. As a result, it is likely that
after-hours trading for less frequently traded stocks will not operate as a continuous trading
environment, but instead may develop into a series of call auctions, similar to that currently
being used by the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX). The goal of these call auctions is to consoli-
date liquidity at a single point in time, thereby reducing transaction costs and price volatility.
Research into the properties of the mechanisms used to open ﬁnancial markets, such as the
TSE, is of particular interest because of the similarities between market opening mechanisms
and these after-hours trading procedures.
This research is also timely because of the trend towards increasing market fragmenta-
tion. This trend increases the likelihood that a security will open for trading simultaneously
1on different exchanges, each with different opening mechanisms. Market participants will
submit their orders to the exchange with lower transaction costs and the optimal level of
transparency given the information content of their trades. This will inﬂuence the location
of price discovery and the relative liquidity of each exchange. This paper examines the inter-
action between different opening procedures by focusing on interlisted stocks that simultane-
ously open for trading on the TSE and a U.S.-based exchange.
The paper makes three important contributions to the literature:
1. I show that the RRT actively participates in the market opening and that the RRT’s
opening trades (i) moderate overnight price changes, (ii) are inﬂuenced by the composi-
tion of order types submitted during the pre-opening session, and (iii) may be motivated,
in part, by inventory adjustment concerns. I ﬁnd that, on average, the RRT’s opening
trades are proﬁtable and constitute about one-ﬁfth of the RRT’s daily trading proﬁts.
The RRT takes advantage of opening order imbalances and thereby appears to provide
greater overnight price stability than is possible with a purely automated electronic
limit order market (e.g. Paris Bourse).
2. I investigate RRT trading behavior in interlisted stocks that simultaneously open on two
exchanges using different opening mechanisms. I argue that the less transparent NYSE
opening call auction contributes to higher adverse selection costs for RRTs assigned to
NYSE-interlisted stocks. As a result, RRTs assigned to NYSE-interlisted stocks partic-
ipate less actively and have lower proﬁts at the market opening. In contrast, the more
transparent Nasdaq pre-trade period does not create the same adverse selection costs
for RRTs assigned to Nasdaq-interlisted stocks.
3. I show that high levels of pre-trade market transparency and poor incentives for early
order submission cause most traders to wait until just before the market opening to sub-
mit their orders. The last few minutes of the pre-opening session are characterized by
rapid inside quote revisions and substantial increases in quoted market depth. This po-
tentially chaotic environment creates disadvantages for market participants with poorer
access to trading facilities.
Domowitz and Madhavan (2000) divide market opening mechanisms into three main groups:
1. Non-differentiated procedures are systems where the opening trade is undistinguished
from subsequent intraday trading in terms of their market protocols (e.g. Nasdaq).
22. Batch opens are opening procedures that set the opening price to clear the overnight
accumulation of orders and orders submitted for execution at the open (e.g. Paris Bourse).
3. Intermediated opens normally involve a form of batch procedure coupled with poten-
tial market maker intervention in the process (e.g. NYSE).
Within these groups are many shades of grey. Opening mechanisms vary with regard to
the level of pre-trade market transparency, the ability of traders to send messages to other
traders, the level of informational parity across market participants, order cancellation poli-
cies, price stability rules, method and ease of order entry, and opening trade allocation rules.
The TSE’s opening mechanism is best described as a batch open. This description, how-
ever, is complicated by the ambiguous role of the RRT at the market opening. While the RRT
cannot directly set the opening price — it is determined automatically by the trading system
— the RRT can and does submit orders for execution at the market open. The RRT can use
these orders to inﬂuence the opening price in a predictable manner.
In contrast, the NYSE specialist has much more control over opening prices and has exclu-
sive knowledge of the public limit order book. Typically, the specialist observes the overnight
accumulation of market and limit orders and then either: (i) sets a single opening price at
which any remaining accumulated order imbalance from market-on-open and public limit or-
ders must be absorbed by the crowd and the specialist’s inventory; or (ii) posts a two-sided
quote based on the limit order book or his or her own willingness to trade. Madhavan and
Panchapagesan (2000), characterizing the low level of pre-trade market transparency on the
NYSE with a “black box,” show that the opening price set by the specialist is more efﬁcient
than the implied market clearing price. Their analysis, however, cannot determine whether
the efﬁciency gain from specialist intermediation would still exist if other market partici-
pants had access to information contained in the limit order book. One goal of the present
study is to ﬁnd out whether participation by the RRT improves the efﬁciency of the open in
an environment with a high level of pre-trade market transparency.
The optimal level of pre-trade market transparency is unclear. Experimental studies by
Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (1999,2000) and Flood, et al. (1999) suggest that higher levels of mar-
ket transparency might lead to higher or lower levels of informational efﬁciency depending
on the speciﬁc underlying market structure. Of particular relevance to the situation faced
by the TSE, Bloomﬁeld and O’Hara (2000) investigate whether transparent markets can sur-
vive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets. The introduction of
3the Market-by-Price system on the TSE in 1990 dramatically increased the level of pre-trade
transparency by allowing market participants to view the depth available at the best ﬁve bid
and ask prices. Madhavan, et al. (2000) ﬁnd that this increase in pre-trade transparency was
detrimental to liquidity and resulted in higher execution costs and increased volatility.
The opening protocols of the Paris Bourse and TSE share several features. Both exchanges
operate as continuous electronic limit order markets and have highly transparent pre-opening
sessions during which market participants can place, modify, or cancel orders for possible
execution at the market opening. Biais, et al. (1999) examine the process of price discovery
and learning during the Paris Bourse’s pre-opening period between 8:30AM and the start
of regular trading at 10:00AM. They ﬁnd that due to the high level of market transparency
and the ease with which orders can be canceled, traders are unwilling to submit the most
informative orders until just prior to the market opening. This paper documents a similar
order submission pattern during the TSE’s pre-opening session. Despite these similarities,
this paper highlights a very important difference between the Paris Bourse and the TSE: the
TSE has an RRT assigned to each stock, but the Paris Bourse does not. I ﬁnd that the RRT is
able to counteract possible opening order imbalances, thereby improving the efﬁciency of the
opening price over what might occur with a limit order market without intermediation.
Price discovery during the TSE’s pre-opening session frequently occurs in an environment
with overlapping orders. Cao, et al. (2000) also ﬁnd overlapping orders are prevalent in the
Nasdaq’s pre-trade period, and argue that dealers often use locked market quotes as an impor-
tant signaling mechanism. They argue that certain dealers consistently show price leadership
and use locked inside quotes to signal which direction the price should move. Signaling, how-
ever, cannot explain the pattern of overlapping orders on the TSE: Most orders submitted
during the pre-opening session are rarely revised or withdrawn prior to the market open.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institutional features
of the TSE. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection criteria. Section 4 describes
the patterns of order submission, bid-ask spreads, and market depth during the pre-opening
session and during regular trading hours. It also decomposes opening trades across market
participant types (retail, institutional, etc.). Section 5 infers which factors inﬂuence RRT
proﬁts and participation at the market opening. Section 6 concludes.
42 Institutional details
Regular trading hours of the TSE are from 9:30AM to 4:00PM and coincide with the regular
trading hours of the major U.S. equity markets. The TSE operates as an electronic limit order
market based on the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS). The limit order book is
transparent. Three alternative services enhance market depth information away from the
inside bid-ask quote: (i) Market-by-price provides committed tradeable volume at the top ﬁve
bid and ask prices; (ii) Market-by-order provides the top ﬁve buy and sell orders; and (iii)
Market-by-broker is similar to market-by-order, except that it provides aggregate volume for
each member ﬁrm at one price rather than individual orders.
Since the Paris Bourse’s trading system was based on the original version of CATS, the
TSE and the Paris Bourse share similar rules. Unlike the Paris Bourse, however, the TSE
assigns a specialist, the RRT, to each actively traded stock. Typically, each RRT is assigned
to about eight different securities for which the main responsibilities are: (i) to contribute
to market liquidity and depth; (ii) to moderate price volatility; (iii) to maintain a continuous
two-sided market; and (iv) to ﬁll odd lot and mixed lot orders. The RRT is also responsible to
ﬁll eligible market orders and tradeable limit orders up to a speciﬁed number of shares, the
Minimum Guaranteed Fill (MGF), if the order cannot be ﬁlled from the order book.
As partial compensation for these responsibilities, the RRT can choose to “auto-participate”
in any immediately executable order less than MGF-size. For eligible orders, the RRT can
choose to purchase up to 50% of an incoming sell order and to sell up to 50% of an incoming
buy order (these percentages have been recently reduced to 40%). Effectively, this allows the
RRT to trade ahead of existing public limit orders. The trading system indicates to other mar-
ket participants that the RRT is participating on the bid and/or ask side. The RRT’s intention
to participate must be announced prior to the incoming order being submitted. The RRT’s
ability to auto-participate cannot be used at the market opening.
A large share of order ﬂow executed on the TSE is internalized by member ﬁrms. When a
member ﬁrm receives a customer order, the member ﬁrm’s “upstairs traders” can hold it for
up to 15 minutes before sending the order to the consolidated limit order book. During this
time, the customer order may either be traded with a member ﬁrm account (as a principal
cross) or traded with another customer order of the member ﬁrm (as an agency cross). Smith,
et al. (2000) ﬁnd that while only 3.33% of trades occur in the upstairs market, these trades
represent 56% of the total trading volume executed on the TSE.
5Opening Protocols: The TSE holds a pre-opening session from 7:00 to 9:30AM during which
market participants may submit market and limit orders for possible execution at the begin-
ning of regular trading at 9:30AM. During this time, the best (highest) bid price and the best
(lowest) ask price are updated to reﬂect new orders and are reported to the public. If there
are overlapping orders, the system reports a single price, the calculated opening price (COP),
that is equal to the price at which the most stock will trade. If there are two or more prices
at which the stock volume would be the same, then: (i) the system selects the price that mini-
mizes the post-opening imbalance; or (ii) if there is no imbalance, or if the resulting imbalance
is the same at each price, the system selects the price nearest to the previous closing price.
During the pre-opening session, market participants can submit standard limit and market-
at-open orders. In addition, there is a special order available to client accounts, an at-the-
opening (OPG) order, that can participate at the opening price of a security, whatever it might
be. In contrast to a market-at-open order, an OPG order does not affect the COP. An OPG
order does not necessarily receive a partial or complete ﬁll, whereas a market order is ﬁlled
completely (or causes a delay, if that is not possible).
Another special order type, a must-be-ﬁlled (MBF) order, is an order to buy or sell a secu-
rity which is part of a basket of stocks being bought or sold because of the expiry of an off-
setting index-based option or futures contract. In order to qualify, orders must be in response
to an expiring options or futures position, and must comprise at least 20 of the securities un-
derlying the TSE 35 Index or at least 70% of the component share capital weighting of the
TSE 100 Index. An MBF order must receive a complete ﬁll at the opening price. All MBF
orders must be entered into the system by 5:30PM on the day before index option expiration
day (index options normally expire on the third Friday of every month). The TSE calculates
and advertises large net imbalances expected for index securities at the opening. The intent
is to reduce the possibility of a large opening imbalance by providing sufﬁcient time to attract
offsetting order ﬂow prior to the open. An MBF order has two important beneﬁts over a stan-
dard market order: (i) it is exempt from the short sale rule; (ii) orders may be entered into the
MGF facility, even if the trades are non-client orders.
There are few incentives for early order submission during the pre-opening session. Dur-
ing the pre-opening session and regular trading hours, an order can establish priority by
either being the ﬁrst order to set a higher bid or lower ask price or being the only order re-
maining on the bid or offer when all competing orders are canceled or ﬁlled. The maximum
number of shares for which an order may establish priority is 10,000 shares for a security
6that is part of the TSE 35 Index, and 5,000 shares for all other securities.
A security will not open for trading if, at the opening time, orders that are guaranteed to
be ﬁlled cannot be completely ﬁlled by offsetting orders or the COP exceeds price volatility
parameters set by the exchange. In addition, exchange rule 4–702(2) states that the RRT
may delay the opening of a security for trading if: (i) The COP differs from the previous
closing price for the security or from the anticipated opening price on another recognized
stock exchange where the security is listed, by an amount exceeding ten ticks for securities
trading at or above $5.00 and fourteen ticks for securities trading below $5.00; (ii) The opening
of another recognized stock exchange where the security is interlisted for trading has been
delayed; or (iii) The COP is less than the permitted difference from the previous closing price
for the security, but is otherwise unreasonable.
Under normal circumstances, all securities open for trading at exactly 9:30AM. Market
orders, better-priced limit orders, and MBF orders are all guaranteed execution at the open
(unless ﬂagged by the anti-scooping rule described below). The trading system then allocates
trades in the following manner:
1. All possible crosses are executed. Client orders are given priority over non-client orders.
2. Equally to client limit orders at the opening price and OPG orders and to an order for the
account of the RRT to a maximum of three times the size of the MGF for that security.
3. Equally to all limit orders at the opening price and OPG orders.
In other words, the TSE trading system automatically executes all possible crosses from the
same member ﬁrm ahead of orders in the limit order book at the opening price. Thus, a
limit order at the opening price may have a better chance of being executed if it is submitted
through a larger member ﬁrm. Partially offsetting this advantage, after all possible crosses
are executed, limit orders at the opening price and OPG orders are ﬁrst allocated on a per
member basis up to a ﬁxed amount and then allocated on a pro rata basis.
Market professionals such as traders employed by member ﬁrms and RTs have access
to superior market trading facilities, which may enable them to receive market information
and submit orders faster than other market participants. During the last few minutes of the
pre-opening session, market professionals may be able to submit a limit order that slightly
undercuts the current COP and thereby receive a larger opening trade allocation.
To offset this potential advantage, the TSE adopted an anti-scooping rule in which any
7market orders or better price limit orders entered after 9:28AM for non-client accounts that
do not change the calculated opening price are converted to OPG orders. In effect, this rule
causes these non-client orders to move to the “back of the line” in terms of opening allocation
priority. When the opening is delayed past 9:30, the rule only applies to RRT orders since
only the RRT knows the exact time at which the security will open, thereby eliminating the
possible timing advantage market professionals normally have over client orders at the open.
In effect, the anti-scooping rule eliminates the RRT’s potential “last-mover” advantage.
3 Data
Trade and quote data for all TSE-listed securities is obtained from the 1998 TSE Equity His-
tory database. Like the widely-used TAQ database produced by the NYSE, the TSE database
reports all executed trades and inside quote revisions. Unlike the TAQ database, which only
includes records of board lot trades posted on the consolidated tape, the TSE database in-
cludes records of trades involving both odd and board lot orders. Trades involving odd lot
orders provide important information about the amount of liquidity trade in a particular se-
curity and about how small retail orders are handled on the TSE.
Trade and quote records in the TSE database provide more detail than comparable TAQ
records. Each trade record details whether the trade involved: special terms, sales delayed,
delayed delivery, cash settlement, certiﬁcate, non net (trade cannot be settled via normal
clearing), do not tender (explicit instructions from client not to tender the stock to an out-
standing offer (e.g. take-over)), auto allocation, money market. Each trade record also identi-
ﬁes the member ﬁrm(s) involved on both sides of the transaction. Each quote record reveals
whether the quote occurred during the pre-opening session or during a trade halt.
For the period January to August 1998, the database also contains markers indicating
whether a trade involved an order for a registered trading account or for a non-client account.
Trade markers are used, in part, to enforce the In-House Client Priority Rule which requires
member ﬁrms to execute their own clients’ orders ahead of any non-client orders at the same
price. Non-client orders include orders for the member ﬁrm itself (inventory orders) and or-
ders for the accounts of partners, directors, ofﬁcers and employees of the ﬁrm.
In addition, there are optional account identiﬁcation codes indicating the speciﬁc account
for which the trade was placed (e.g. an inventory account). Inventory accounts are used by
member ﬁrms to accumulate a large long or short position in a security for possible use in
8an “upstairs” trade with an institutional client. These upstairs trades are executed on the
exchange as a “put-through” or cross. Member ﬁrms can add to their accumulated position
either by trading directly with the limit order book or by internalizing order ﬂow.
The inventory account marker alone does not suggest the direction of institutional trade.
The inventory account marker may be used when the member ﬁrm is accumulating a position
for a institutional client by participating in smaller retail orders that may either have been
sent to the consolidated limit order book or that have been internalized by the member ﬁrm,
but it may also be used when the member ﬁrm is actually executing a large cross involving
the institutional client. The percentage of trades involving non-client inventory accounts do
provide a good proxy for the level of institutional trade in a security at a particular time, and
hence a good proxy for the level of informed trade in a particular security.
The trade markers and account identiﬁcation codes can also be used to approximate par-
ticipation by the RRT. The trade marker “R” indicates trades that involve orders placed by
a RT, not necessarily an order placed by the responsible RT. RTs can, and do, place orders
for securities other than the securities for which they are directly responsible. It is possible,
however, to isolate trade records involving the responsible RT by restricting attention to trade
records with the appropriate member ﬁrm ﬁeld and the alpha-numeric account identiﬁcation
code. Although account identiﬁcation codes are conﬁdential, it is possible to obtain the rele-
vant codes for the RRT by concentrating on odd lot trade records. Because the RRT has an
obligation to ﬁll all odd lot market orders, I can use these trade records to identify uniquely
the member ﬁrm ﬁeld and the alpha-numeric account identiﬁcation code that correspond to
the security’s RRT. Using this “ﬁngerprint,” I can identify orders involving the RRT.
Each RRT must have an approved backup to act as a substitute in times of illness and dur-
ing scheduled vacations. Because backup RTs do not necessarily use the same trade marker
“ﬁngerprint,” my reported averages understate the proportion of trade from the RRT and
overstate the proportion of trade from “other” RTs. My reported regression results attempt to
screen for occurrences when the RRT changes.
3.1 Selection Criteria
At the beginning of the sample period (Jan. 1, 1998), 1,763 different securities were listed on
the TSE. Because most of these securities are not actively traded and the trading properties
of different security types are not directly comparable, I restrict attention to actively traded
common shares of Canadian-based companies. My sample excludes the following securities:
91. Warrants, installment receipts, preferred shares, debentures, limited partnership units,
trust units, index participation units, securities trading in U.S. funds, and securities
based outside of Canada.
2. Securities that were under suspension by the TSE at any time during 1998.
3. Securities that had a monthly trading volume with a value of less than $100,000 during
any month in the sample period.
4. Securities that had a market capitalization less than C$100 million on Dec. 31, 1997.
5. Securities that were added or eliminated from the TSE stock list during 1998.
For convenience, I also exclude any security that changed its symbol during 1998 (either
through a name change or a substitutional listing). Employing this selection criteria produces
a ﬁnal sample of 459 securities. As long as I restrict attention to common shares, the results
presented in this paper are not sensitive to the security selection criteria.
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the stocks included in the sample. Based on market
capitalization at the close of trading on Dec. 31, 1997, I divide the sample into size quintiles.
On average, the number of daily transactions, the daily trading volume, the daily dollar value
of trading volume, and the number of inside quote revisions increase with ﬁrm size. The
largest ﬁrms (quintile 1) are much larger and more actively traded than ﬁrms in the next
largest quintile. The table also highlights the important role of interlisted securities on the
TSE. In 1998, 58.7% of the total value of trading volume on the TSE was comprised of trading
in securities that were also listed on a U.S.-based exchange, and 25% of trading in these stocks
occurs in U.S. markets.1
During the sample period, many securities listed on the TSE were also listed on the Mon-
treal Exchange (ME). In 1998, the ME accounted for 10.0% of the trading volume in Cana-
dian securities (TSE Review, 1998). In 1999, a major restructuring agreement between the
Canadian exchanges consolidated all equity trading in senior equities on the TSE. Because of
insufﬁcient data and the diminished importance of the ME in equity trading, this study ig-
nores order ﬂow submitted to the ME. Consequently, my results understate trading volumes
for regional Quebec-based ﬁrms that tend to trade primarily on the ME and my results may
be sensitive to effects caused by brokerage ﬁrms that send retail order ﬂow to preferred mar-
ket makers on the ME. The close linkage of the trading systems used by the TSE and the ME
1Source: Toronto Stock Exchange 1998 Annual Report.
10Table 1: Composition of stocks satisfying selection criteria. Stocks are grouped into
quintiles according to their market capitalization on Dec. 31, 1997. Stocks are classiﬁed un-
der the category “Changed listing status” if during 1998: (i) they become listed on a U.S. ex-
change; (ii) there is a change in their U.S. exchange trading symbol; (iii) they become delisted
from a U.S. exchange; (iv) they change U.S. exchange. The descriptive statistics are reported
as averages across all applicable ﬁrm-days. The average closing price is based on the last
reported normal trade, omitting trading days in which the stock did not trade.
Size Quintile (1 = largest)
Total 5 4 3 2 1
Total sample 459 92 92 92 92 91
Exchange listing status:
Non-interlisted on U.S. exchange 315 73 76 62 62 42
Interlisted on NYSE 60 0 3 8 13 36
Interlisted on AMEX 19 1 2 9 3 4
Interlisted on Nasdaq 55 17 11 10 10 7
Changed listing status during 1998 8 1 0 3 4 0
Descriptive Statistics:
Market cap. 12/31/97 (C$M) 127.8 216.9 414.0 942.2 5,908.7
Avg. closing share price (C$) 10.84 14.13 19.45 27.41 45.00
Avg. # of transactions / day 21.0 19.7 27.8 49.1 279.1
Avg. daily trading volume (‘000) 60.1 59.0 64.3 124.5 428.5
Avg. daily dollar volume (C$000) 219 332 659 1,853 14,610
Avg. # of inside quote revisions / day 30.2 31.1 43.5 72.7 338.3
ensure that, in general, trades cannot be executed on one exchange if there is a more favorable
quoted price on the other exchange.
Internalized Order Flow: A large proportion of trades executed on the TSE originate from
a relatively small number of member ﬁrms. Table 2 illustrates that the ten most active mem-
ber ﬁrms participated in 52.52% of the TSE’s total trade dollar volume over the sample period.
The ongoing consolidation of Canada’s ﬁnancial sector suggests that, over time, just a hand-
ful of member ﬁrms may execute an ever larger proportion of trades on the TSE. This has
important potential implications regarding the ability of member ﬁrms to “internalize” trade.
Table 2 identiﬁes the share of each member ﬁrm’s trading dollar volume that was submit-
ted for: (i) a registered trader, employed by the member ﬁrm, trading in a stock of responsi-
bility (RRT); (ii) a registered trader, employed by the member ﬁrm, trading in a non-assigned
stock (ORT); (iii) a non-client (NC); or (iv) a client (C). Two observations stand out:
11Table 2: Top Ten Member Firms by Trading Dollar Volume Member ﬁrm names and
their corresponding TSE trading numbers are effective July 6, 1998. The sample period is
from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998.
% of Trading Dollar Vol. % of TSE
Rank Member Firm (Trading Number) RRT ORT NC C $Vol
1 RBC Dominion Securities Inc. (02) 1.42 4.07 32.32 62.20 6.69
2 Nesbitt Burns Inc. (09) 0.41 3.73 43.72 52.15 6.28
3 CIBC Wood Gundy Securities Inc. (79) 0.00 0.00 39.82 60.18 4.90
4 ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (85) 0.09 1.90 32.32 65.69 4.29
5 TD Securities Inc. (07) 0.00 0.01 37.79 62.20 3.83
6 Midland Walwyn Capital Inc. (39) 5.03 7.20 43.92 43.85 3.79
7 First Marathon Securities Ltd. (80) 0.00 3.09 44.67 52.25 3.13
8 Levesque Beaubien Geoffrion Inc. (63) 6.61 18.05 39.70 35.65 2.23
9 Grifﬁths McBurney & Partners (74) 4.06 12.29 49.53 34.12 2.00
10 Gordon Capital Corp. (81) 0.00 0.00 35.59 64.41 1.67
1. On average about 32% of a member ﬁrm’s trading dollar volume is from non-client or-
ders. This reﬂects the importance of “upstairs” trading for TSE member ﬁrms.
2. RTs actively trade in stocks that are not directly under their responsibility. For many
ﬁrms, RT trade in non-assigned securities exceeds RT trade in assigned securities.
4 Order submission patterns
To understand the RRT’s role during the pre-opening session, I ﬁrst document the typical
order submission pattern during this session. Reﬂecting the similarities between the opening
protocols of the TSE and the Paris Bourse, I ﬁnd that order submission patterns during the
TSE pre-opening session are similar to those documented by Biais, et al. (1999) for the Paris
Bourse. Speciﬁcally, order submission is concentrated in the last few minutes prior to the
start of regular trading. The high level of market transparency during the pre-opening session
discourages traders from submitting their orders early for fear of revealing their information.
Also, traders are unwilling to offer free options to the market, and thereby, subject themselves
to the likely event that additional information will be revealed to the market prior to the
beginning of regular trading hours. As explained in section 3, the TSE provides few incentives
to counteract these concerns and thereby promote early order submission.
Figure 1 illustrates the number of inside quote revisions per ﬁve minute interval during
the pre-opening session and regular trading hours. An inside quote revision is deﬁned as a
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Figure 1: Average number of inside quote revisions per ﬁve minute interval. Results
are calculated at ﬁve minute intervals, taking the average number of inside quote revisions
during the time interval across all trading days and all stocks in the quintile. An inside quote
revision occurs when there is a change in the inside bid or ask price and/or in the inside bid
or ask size.
size. The key empirical regularities characterizing the pre-opening behavior and quotes are:
• The number of inside quote revisions accelerates as the opening approaches.
• The U–shaped pattern of inside quote revisions during regular trading hours is consis-
tent with previously observed intraday patterns of order submission.
• On average, the frequency of inside quotes revisions rises with ﬁrm size. There is a
big difference between the trading activity for ﬁrms in the largest size quintile and the
corresponding level of trading activity for ﬁrms in other size quintiles.
The theoretical model of Medrano and Vives (1998) investigates a price discovery process
similar to a pre-opening session and shows that during the beginning of the session an in-
formed trader may deliberately manipulate prices using a contrarian strategy to neutralize
the effects of the trades of competitive informed agents. To investigate the possibility of mar-
ket manipulation, I investigate the percentage of inside quote revisions that indicate that
an existing order has been withdrawn. Speciﬁcally, an inside quote revision resulting from
a withdrawn order is indicated by: (i) an increase in the bid-ask spread; (ii) no change in a
positive bid-ask spread but a decrease in either the bid size or the ask size; (iii) no change
in a bid-ask spread of zero but a decrease in the minimum of the bid size and the ask size.
As reported in table 3, about 95% of all quote revisions lead to an increase in market depth
13Table 3: Percentage of inside quote revisions resulting from a withdrawn order.
These quote revisions are indicated by: (i) an increase in the bid-ask spread; (ii) no change in
a positive bid-ask spread but a decrease in either the bid size or the ask size; (iii) no change
in a bid-ask spread of zero but a decrease in the minimum of the bid size and the ask size.
Size Quintile
Time period 5 4 3 2 1
7:00 - 7:30 4.18% 6.95% 6.62% 6.79% 2.88%
7:30 - 8:00 8.22% 7.80% 6.95% 7.18% 9.03%
8:00 - 8:30 4.35% 6.64% 5.36% 6.30% 7.47%
8:30 - 9:00 3.47% 3.93% 3.44% 3.57% 5.06%
9:00 - 9:30 4.86% 4.96% 5.16% 4.85% 4.82%
and/or an increase in the bid-ask spread. In other words, most orders are “serious” and are
submitted with the intention of being executed.
Figure 2 illustrates the average number of inside quote revisions per one minute interval
during the pre-opening session for securities in the largest size quintile. In the ﬁrst few
minutes, there is a small surge in quote revisions that may be attributed to the submission
of new orders that arrived at member ﬁrms during the overnight non-trading period. These
orders may have been submitted early in the session in an effort to be the ﬁrst order to set a
new price and thereby gain priority in the opening trade allocation. A more likely explanation
is that these orders are just small retail orders that were submitted by investors who ﬁnd it
more convenient to trade after normal working hours.
Figure 2 also illustrates that quote revision accelerates every minute up to and includ-
ing the last minute of the pre-opening session. A large number of traders literally wait until
the last minute to submit their orders despite potential communication-related problems that
might prevent their timely arrival. The rapid quote revision at the end of the pre-opening
session could be advantageous to traders with the ability to take advantage of any favorable
opening imbalances. The TSE’s anti-scooping rule is designed to compensate for this by pe-
nalizing non-client orders submitted during the last two minutes of the pre-opening session.
Figure 3 illustrates the intraday pattern of the percentile bid-ask spread. The percentile
bid-ask spread is deﬁned as
2∗(ask−bid)
bid+ask , where bid and ask are the most recent, best bid and
ask prices, respectively. The intraday pattern is similar across ﬁrm sizes. In general, aver-
age spreads are inversely related to ﬁrm size (and perhaps more accurately, average trading
volumes). Spreads narrow throughout the pre-opening session, with the narrowest spreads










Figure 2: Average number of inside quote revisions per one minute interval during
the pre-opening session for stocks in the largest size quintile. Results are calculated
by taking the average number of inside quote revisions during the time interval across all
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Figure 3: Intraday pattern of the percentile bid-ask spread. The percentile bid-ask
spread is deﬁned as 2 ∗ (ask − bid)/(bid + ask), where bid and ask are the most recent, best
bid and ask prices, respectively. Results are calculated at ﬁve minute intervals, taking the
average across all trading days and all stocks in the quintile.
15number of securities with overlapping orders. As regular trading hours begin, spreads widen
initially as these overlapping limit orders are executed. During the remainder of the trading
day, spreads gradually narrow.
McInish and Wood (1992) and Chan, et al. (1995) have analyzed the intraday pattern of
bid-ask spreads on the NYSE and the Nasdaq, respectively. McInish and Wood found that the
bid-ask spread for NYSE stocks has a crude reverse J–shaped pattern with higher spreads
near the beginning and the end of the day. In contrast, Chan, et al. ﬁnd that the bid-ask
spread for Nasdaq stocks is relatively stable throughout the day but narrows signiﬁcantly
during the ﬁnal hour of trading. The pattern observed near the end of the trading day on the
TSE differs from the observed pattern on both of these exchanges.
Figure 4 illustrates the intraday pattern of quoted market depth available at the inside
quote. When the percentile bid-ask spread is less then 2%, quoted market depth is deﬁned as
the average of the quoted size, in dollar terms, available at the inside bid and at the inside ask.
Otherwise, quoted market depth is deﬁned as zero. This deﬁnition provides an indication of
the dollar magnitude of an order which could be executed at the inside quote without incurring
large transaction costs from the bid-ask spread. Expressing quoted market depth in dollar
terms allows us to compare liquidity across different ﬁrms. It is important to note that this
measure provides only a proxy for the actual depth available. It does not make any allowances
for depth that might exist a single tick size away from the inside quote nor does it account for
hidden liquidity available from the upstairs market or from the RRT’s MGF requirements.
For all ﬁrm sizes, quoted market depth increases throughout the pre-opening session and
reaches its highest level of the day at the market open. For smaller ﬁrms, quoted market
depth during the ﬁrst hour of the pre-opening session is very low. For example, by 8:00AM
the average quoted market depth for ﬁrms in size quintiles 5 and 3 has reached just $2,742
and $5,114, respectively.
• These liquidity levels indicate that a relatively small order could alter the pre-opening
quotes for small stocks. In sharp contrast, the pre-opening quotes for large stocks
have substantial ﬁnancial backing, with an average quoted market depth of $113,000
by 8:00AM, and are thus less subject to manipulation.
After peaking at the market open, quoted market depth drops during the ﬁrst few minutes
of trading as overlapping orders are executed. After this initial drop, quoted market depth





















Figure 4: Intraday pattern of quoted market depth available at the inside quote.
Results are calculated at ﬁve minute intervals, taking the average across all trading days and
all stocks in the quintile. When the percentile bid-ask spread is less than 2%, quoted market
depth is deﬁned as the average of the quoted size, in dollar terms, available at the inside bid
and at the inside ask. Otherwise, quoted market depth is deﬁned as zero.
sizes, the difference in magnitudes is stark. Quoted market depth for ﬁrms in the largest
size quintile averages about $300,000 during the trading day, while the analogous number
for ﬁrms in the smallest size quintile is about $26,000. From these observed average levels, I
infer that the RRT’s MGF requirements are relatively more important for smaller ﬁrms.
Overlapping Orders: A unique feature of the pre-opening session is the possibility that
limit orders may overlap. When the highest bid price exceeds the lowest ask price, a single
indicated price (the COP) is posted based on the algorithm described in section 3. As ﬁgure 5
illustrates, overlapping orders occur frequently, especially for large stocks, and the likelihood
of overlapping orders rises as the market opening approaches.
In the absence of trades, overlapping orders and quotes are a deﬁning characteristic of
most pre-opening sessions. Cao, et al. (2000) ﬁnd that locked and crossed inside quotes ac-
count for 11.3% and 23.6% of market quotes during the Nasdaq pre-opening session. They
argue that Nasdaq dealers use crossed and locked inside quotes to signal to other market
makers which direction the price should move. Because these quotes are non-binding, Nas-
daq dealers can revise them frequently up until the market open.
• Overlapping orders do not serve a deliberate signaling role on the TSE. Pre-opening
quotes on the TSE are driven by orders, not dealer quotes, and these orders are rarely













Figure 5: Overlapping orders. Results correspond to the percentage of ﬁrm-days in the































Figure 7: Empirical CDF of last pre-opening quote revision times.
Length of pre-opening session: The paucity of quote revisions in the ﬁrst hour suggests
that the market’s performance would not be qualitatively affected were the pre-opening ses-
sion shortened. To investigate this further, I consider the distribution of the times of the ﬁrst
and last quote revisions.
Prior to the start of the pre-opening session, the system posts a quote reﬂecting good
till canceled orders carried forward from the previous trading session. Because these initial
quotes reﬂect old information, the price discovery process does not begin until there has been
a quote revision. Let NQ and λit denote the number of securities in quintile Q and the time of
the ﬁrst quote revision for ﬁrm i on trading day t, respectively. Then the empirical cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the share of ﬁrm-days where the ﬁrst quote revisions occurred








I(λit ≤ t), l ∈ [0,150] (1)
where I(λit ≤ l) = 1 if λit ≤ l; 0 otherwise. Figure 6 illustrates that approximately 68% of ﬁrm-
days in the largest size quintile had at least one quote revision prior to 8:00AM. Similarly,
about 33% and 28% of ﬁrms-days in quintiles 3 and 5, respectively, had at least one quote
revision prior to 8:00AM. Thus, the price discovery process appears to begin surprisingly
early, despite relatively few incentives to submit orders early in the pre-opening session. As
reported by Biais, et al. (1999) for the Paris Bourse, however, these early order submissions
contain signiﬁcantly less information than orders submitted closer to the market open.
An empirical CDF for the time of the last quote revision is also estimated. This function
19provides an indication of how “fresh” quotes are at the beginning of the trading session and
whether there are opportunities for astute investors to exploit “stale” orders at the market
open. As ﬁgure 7 illustrates, the last quote revision occurs during the last ﬁve minutes of the
pre-opening session for approximately 79% of ﬁrm-days in the largest quintile. In contrast,
the last quote revision occurs during the last ﬁve minutes for only about 41% and 34% of
ﬁrm-days in quintiles 3 and 5, respectively.
• The last pre-opening quote for smallest ﬁrms is often stale. Overall, while the pre-
opening session is relatively active for larger ﬁrms, it is not particularly effective at
promoting liquidity for smaller ﬁrms.
Opening trade volume: The open is characterized by the highest market depth and the
lowest bid-ask spreads of the trading day. The ensuing low transaction costs should create
a favorable environment for agents to trade. This is veriﬁed by table 4 which reports the
average daily trade volume, at the “instantaneous” open and during the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes of
regular trading hours, as a percentage of total trading volume.
Because the calculation of cross-sectional, time-series averages can be ambiguous, I am
explicit here. Let Viτ and V O
iτ denote the total number of shares of ﬁrm i traded, during
regular trading hours and at the open, respectively, on trading day τ. Let N and T denote the
number of ﬁrms and the number of trading days, respectively. Then the average trade volume












In general, smaller ﬁrms are less actively traded and have greater informational asymme-
tries. Thus, the enhanced liquidity provided by the market opening is especially important for
smaller ﬁrms. This is conﬁrmed in table 4 and is consistent with similar results reported by
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) for the NYSE and by Cao, et al. (1997) for the Nasdaq.
At the open, market participants trading in interlisted stocks may decide that the opening
mechanism of either the TSE or the U.S. exchange will provide better trade execution given
the size and the information content of their order. This decision impacts where pre-trade
price discovery occurs and how the RRT responds to competitive pressure from U.S. market
makers. Although table 4 reports no consistent differences in opening volumes between in-
terlisted and non-interlisted ﬁrms, the analysis in section 5 will show that these aggregate
volumes conceal potential differences in the information content of the order ﬂow.
20Table 4: Average opening trade volume and the frequency of opening trades. Open-
ing trades include all trades that occur at the instant the security opens for regular trading
(normally at 9:30AM, except when the opening is delayed). Averages are calculated using
equation (2).
Size Quintile (1 = large)
5 4 3 2 1
% of total daily trading volume at open (“instantaneous”):
All securities 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.5
Non-interlisted 2.1 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.4
NYSE interlisted NA 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.5
Nasdaq interlisted 2.4 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.7
AMEX interlisted 2.7 1.5 1.8 0.7 1.4
% of total daily trading volume during ﬁrst 5 min. of regular trading:
All securities 4.8 4.1 3.3 2.9 2.9
Non-interlisted 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.8
NYSE interlisted NA 2.3 1.8 2.2 2.8
Nasdaq interlisted 6.3 4.6 3.8 2.4 3.7
AMEX interlisted 4.1 2.7 3.3 2.7 3.0
% of ﬁrm-days with opening trade
All securities 38.3 38.7 42.7 55.8 88.0
Non-interlisted 35.0 36.3 40.4 53.4 83.4
NYSE interlisted NA 50.0 38.4 70.3 93.5
Nasdaq interlisted 49.6 51.8 64.7 63.1 85.2
AMEX interlisted 67.1 48.4 46.6 42.1 95.6
% of ﬁrm-days with delayed opening trade
All securities 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.6 3.0
Non-interlisted 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.6
NYSE interlisted NA 0.3 0.9 5.3 4.9
Nasdaq interlisted 0.4 0.7 0.3 1.8 2.7
AMEX interlisted 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.8 1.8
21The opening of the TSE is the most active period of the trading day. In comparison with
the NYSE and the Nasdaq, however, opening trades on the TSE account for a much lower
percentage of total daily trading volume. Speciﬁcally, Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000)
ﬁnd that, on average, 9.7% and 17.5% of the total daily dollar trading volume of the NYSE
occurs at the open and during the ﬁrst half hour of trading, respectively. Cao, et al. (1997)
ﬁnd that, on average, 8.6% of total daily trading volume on the Nasdaq occurs during the ﬁrst
three minutes of trading. In comparison with these exchanges, the TSE’s opening mechanism
appears to be less effective at attracting order ﬂow.
Both the likelihood of an opening trade and the likelihood of an opening delay increase
with ﬁrm size. Large NYSE-interlisted ﬁrms are much more likely to have an opening delay.
Unlike the “automated” opening of the TSE, the NYSE opening is frequently delayed by the
NYSE specialist in an attempt to attract order ﬂow from ﬂoor traders to offset an opening
imbalance. TSE-based trading in these NYSE-interlisted ﬁrms is frequently delayed until the
NYSE opening call auction is complete.
4.1 Composition of Opening Trades
This section examines the composition of trades that are executed at the beginning of regular
trading hours. As explained previously, the TSE trading system automatically executes all
possible crosses from the same member ﬁrm ahead of orders in the limit order book at the
opening price. Tables 5–7 demonstrate the importance of this opening trade allocation rule
by dividing opening trades between those involving the same member ﬁrm on both sides
of the trade and those involving two different member ﬁrms. Opening trade dollar volume
is classiﬁed as involving six possible order types: (1) RRT board lot; (2) RRT odd lot; (3)
registered trader for non-assigned stocks (ORT); (4) non-client (NC) for inventory accounts;
(5) non-client (NC) for non-inventory accounts; (6) client.
Approximately 23.6%, 17.7%, and 16.0% of the dollar volume of opening trades involve the
same member ﬁrm on both sides of the trade for the largest, middle, and smallest quintile,
respectively. The same member ﬁrm is more likely to be involved on the both sides of a trade
for larger stocks. This order ﬂow represents order ﬂow that could be internalized by member
ﬁrms in a more decentralized opening procedure.
The RRT actively participates in the opening. Approximately 7.6%, 19.6%, and 19.9%
of the total trading dollar volume involves the RRT for the largest, middle, and smallest
quintile, respectively. The RRT provides much needed liquidity at the open to infrequently
22Table 5: Composition of trades at open by trading dollar volume for ﬁrms in largest
quintile (Quintile 1). The reported numbers indicate the percentage of all reported open-
ing trades within the subsample of ﬁrms and trading days that had the indicated property.
By construction, the reported percentages should sum to 100 (allowing for rounding errors).
Opening trades include all trades that occur at the instant the security opens for regular
trading (normally at 9:30AM, except when the opening is delayed).
Same member ﬁrm involved on both sides of trade [23.63%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.17
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Sell ORT 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.65
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.50 0.72 1.69
Non-Client Other 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.36 2.41 2.44
Client 0.10 0.01 0.58 1.59 1.63 9.92
Different member ﬁrms involved on each side of trade [76.37%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.27 0.30 1.68
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 1.20
Sell ORT 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.64 0.53 2.67
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.29 0.02 0.63 1.53 1.94 4.41
Non-Client Other 0.25 0.02 0.54 1.20 13.33 5.13
Client 1.99 0.87 2.56 4.65 11.71 17.39
23Table 6: Composition of trades at open by trading dollar volume for ﬁrms in the
“middle” quintile (Quintile 3). The reported numbers indicate the percentage of all re-
ported opening trades within the subsample of ﬁrms and trading days that had the indicated
property. By construction, the reported percentages should sum to 100 (allowing for rounding
errors). Opening trades include all trades that occur at the instant the security opens for
regular trading (normally at 9:30AM, except when the opening is delayed).
Same member ﬁrm involved on both sides of trade [17.68%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.29
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Sell ORT 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.85
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.11 1.15
Non-Client Other 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.55
Client 0.59 0.03 1.70 1.30 0.46 9.41
Different member ﬁrms involved on each side of trade [82.32%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.50 0.58 7.43
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.90
Sell ORT 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.09 2.28
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.45 0.03 0.11 1.00 0.64 5.42
Non-Client Other 0.38 0.04 0.20 1.07 0.66 4.35
Client 7.16 0.75 2.17 5.70 4.29 36.17
traded smaller ﬁrms. Because the RRT must ﬁll odd lot orders, I decompose the RRT’s order
ﬂow between that involving board and odd lots. A signiﬁcant majority (71%, 91%, and 94%
for the largest, middle, and smallest quintile, respectively) of the RRT’s order ﬂow involves
board lot trades, which for the most part, represent voluntary participation.
Because RTs can, and do, place trades for other securities, I examine the level of RT trade
in non-assigned securities (denoted ORT). I ﬁnd that ORT trade accounts for approximately
8.4%, 8.2%, and 6.4% of the total trading dollar volume for the largest, middle, and smallest
quintile, respectively. ORT trade is relatively more important for the largest ﬁrms and in fact
exceeds RRT trade in these securities. Thus, the RRT faces considerable competition for order
ﬂow from RTs assigned to other securities. In this sense, it may be more accurate in certain
24Table 7: Composition of trades at open by trading dollar volume for ﬁrms in smallest
quintile (Quintile 5). The reported numbers indicate the percentage of all reported open-
ing trades within the subsample of ﬁrms and trading days that had the indicated property.
By construction, the reported percentages should sum to 100 (allowing for rounding errors).
Opening trades include all trades that occur at the instant the security opens for regular
trading (normally at 9:30AM, except when the opening is delayed).
Same member ﬁrm involved on both sides of trade [16.03%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.47
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Sell ORT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.34
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.08 1.30
Non-Client Other 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.43
Client 0.38 0.02 0.32 1.33 0.52 10.09
Different member ﬁrms involved on each side of trade [83.97%]
Buy Side
RRT Non-Client
Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.73 0.80 7.41
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.62
Sell ORT 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.43 0.39 2.18
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.41 0.01 0.21 0.62 0.82 3.86
Non-Client Other 0.65 0.01 0.22 0.86 0.74 5.35
Client 7.55 0.48 1.89 5.42 5.44 36.39
instances to model the TSE using a multiple dealer environment.
Tables 8 and 9 are designed to establish whether these results are particular to the mar-
ket opening or are general features of the overall TSE market structure. These results are
reported in terms of the number of transactions instead of trading dollar volume. Because the
relative proportions of each trade type is similar using these two measures, I am reassured
that the results are not being dominated by a single high priced security. There are several
observations worth noting:
• The percentage of trades involving two client orders is much higher at the market open
than during regular trading hours (e.g. 39.2% versus 21.8% for the largest quintile).
25• The percentage of trades involving a non-client inventory account order is much higher
during regular trading hours than at the market open (e.g. 29.8% versus 14.9% for the
largest quintile). Although crosses receive priority at the open, the respective member
ﬁrm has little control over the opening price (which is determined automatically by the
trading system). In contrast, “put-throughs” that are executed during regular trading
hours can be executed at a time when the prevailing price may be favorable.
• Generally, at both the open and during regular trading hours, there is a higher propor-
tion of client orders on the buy side than on the sell side.
5 Registered Trader Participation
Two observations suggest the RRT has little incentive to trade at the market opening. First,
the high level of pre-trade market transparency suggests that the RRT does not have a large
informational advantage relative to other market participants. Second, the RRT cannot set
the opening price directly and must submit orders prior to 9:28AM in order to inﬂuence the
opening price. Despite these two observations, my previous results demonstrate that the RRT
actively participates in trades executed at the market open. This section attempts to solve this
puzzle by isolating the factors which contribute to RRT participation at the market opening.
The analysis in this section uses the overnight price change and the likelihood of an open-
ing trade as exogenous factors that inﬂuence RRT participation and proﬁts at the market
opening. Because the available database contains information about executed trades but not
about submitted orders, it is impossible to isolate completely the impact of RRT trades on
these variables. To account for this, I assume that, under most circumstances the RRT will
wait until the ﬁnal ﬁve minutes of the market opening to submit an order. The RRT has the in-
centive to delay submitting an order in order to take advantage of economic information and
order imbalances that may develop during the pre-opening session. In addition, the RRT’s
superior access to market trading facilities eliminates incentives to submit an order early
because of possible communication related problems. Thus, I assume that overnight price
changes calculated using the indicated opening price at 9:25AM can be treated as exogenous.
Similarly, the likelihood of an opening trade is indicated by the presence of an overlapping
order at 9:25AM, which is also assumed to be exogenous.
In part, the RRT’s decision to participate at the market opening depends on whether or
not market conditions exist such that there will be an opening trade. A high probability of
26Table 8: Composition of trades at open. The reported numbers indicate the percentage
of all reported opening trades within the subsample of ﬁrms and trading days that had the
indicated property. By construction, the reported percentages should sum to 100 (allowing
for rounding errors). Opening trades include all trades that occur at the instant the security




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.27 0.28 2.89
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.32 11.69
Sell ORT 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.45 0.44 4.35
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.22 0.24 0.41 0.89 0.82 5.75
Non-Client Other 0.23 0.24 0.41 0.77 1.15 5.18




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.52 0.59 8.46
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.26 6.23
Sell ORT 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.12 3.83
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.36 0.18 0.12 0.61 0.37 5.38
Non-Client Other 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.50 0.49 4.19




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.65 0.64 7.51
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.11 4.44
Sell ORT 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.36 0.35 3.02
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.35 0.12 0.13 0.64 0.51 4.98
Non-Client Other 0.41 0.17 0.19 0.54 0.61 4.86
Client 5.67 4.82 1.79 5.06 4.42 47.16
27Table 9: Composition of all executed trades during regular trading hours. The re-
ported numbers indicate the percentage of all reported trades during regular trading hours
within the subsample of ﬁrms and trading days that had the indicated property. By construc-




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.02 0.00 0.55 1.19 0.73 7.15
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.24 5.68
Sell ORT 0.53 0.01 0.79 1.55 0.97 4.91
Side Non-Client Inventory 1.10 0.34 1.41 3.13 1.64 9.00
Non-Client Other 0.74 0.20 0.98 1.85 1.24 5.30




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.04 0.00 0.36 1.03 1.03 10.17
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.17 2.93
Sell ORT 0.37 0.01 0.15 0.43 0.37 3.37
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.89 0.21 0.29 1.01 0.77 6.21
Non-Client Other 0.95 0.20 0.34 0.81 0.75 4.80




Board Lot Odd Lot ORT Inventory Other Client
RRT Board Lot 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.74 1.22 9.39
RRT Odd Lot 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.13 1.70
Sell ORT 0.30 0.02 0.27 0.62 0.67 3.29
Side Non-Client Inventory 0.63 0.12 0.53 1.11 1.16 5.78
Non-Client Other 1.05 0.17 0.56 1.21 1.32 5.98
Client 9.06 2.38 2.85 6.41 6.29 34.65
28an opening trade is signaled to the RRT by the existence of an overlapping order during the
pre-opening session. To isolate the factors that lead to an opening trade, I estimate the probit
model:
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, and the variables are deﬁned as:




i , and Dax
i are dummy variables indicating whether the stock i is interlisted on
the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX, respectively.
3. PO
i,t indicates the average of the inside bid and ask prices posted at 9:25AM for stock i on
trading day t.
4. PC
i,t−1 indicates the closing transaction price for stock i on trading day t − 1.
5. DV oli indicates the average daily dollar volume traded for ﬁrm i (in ‘00,000,000s).
The motivation for this model is as follows. Larger overnight price changes generally con-
tribute to greater differences in investor stock valuations. Thus, I expect that the probability
of an overlapping order, and thus the likelihood of trade at the market opening to be increas-
ing in the size of overnight price changes. I also expect that the probability of an overlapping
order (and an opening trade) rises with the stock’s average daily trading volume. Finally, I add
dummy variables to isolate the impact of average daily trading volume for interlisted stocks.
The presence of alternative opening mechanisms may result in interlisted stocks having a
higher or lower probability of an overlapping order in comparison with non-interlisted stocks
with the same average daily trading volume. All else equal, interlisted stocks may have a
lower probability of an overlapping order (and an opening trade) if market participants prefer
to send their opening orders to the U.S.-based exchange or if they prefer to wait until after the
two exchanges have opened. The behavior of traders in these stocks depends, in part, on the
relative level of pre-trade market transparency of each exchange.
Other results, not shown here, suggest that adding dummy variables for interlisted stocks
as separate terms in the estimated models produces unclear results. In part, this is because
of the signiﬁcant positive correlation between a stock’s average daily trading volume and
whether or not the stock is interlisted.
29Table 10: Estimation results: Probit model of the probability of an overlapping or-
der at 9:25AM. Standard errors are reported below the coefﬁcient estimates in parenthesis.
Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. LLF
denotes the value of the log likelihood function. Number of observations: All: 57375; Q1:
11375; Q2–Q5: 11500.
|∆P| DV ol (Dny · DV ol) (Dnz · DV ol) (Dax · DV ol) α0 LLF
All 0.114 1.98 -0.498 1.10 0.205 -0.636 -32796
(0.00416)∗∗ (0.0325)∗∗ (0.0405)∗∗ (0.0891)∗∗ (0.0892)∗ (0.00874)∗∗
Size quintile:
Q1 0.140 1.11 -0.203 0.929 0.443 -0.139 -4031.6
(0.0171)∗∗ (0.0432)∗∗ (0.0402)∗∗ (0.127)∗∗ (0.0898)∗∗ (0.0319)∗∗
Q2 0.167 2.70 -0.406 0.461 -1.11 -0.801 -7077.3
(0.0112)∗∗ (0.0900)∗∗ (0.0987)∗∗ (0.148)∗∗ (0.229)∗∗ (0.0242)∗∗
Q3 0.140 4.87 1.90 -0.987 8.75 -0.979 -6888.3
(0.00929)∗∗ (0.176)∗∗ (0.624)∗∗ (0.217)∗∗ (0.714)∗∗ (0.0230)∗∗
Q4 0.0906 7.01 -2.71 4.63 0.325 -0.879 -6934.3
(0.00798)∗∗ (0.385)∗∗ (0.492)∗∗ (0.595)∗∗ (0.646) (0.0232)∗∗
Q5 0.103 6.39 — 4.62 34.0 -0.826 -6991.6
(0.00788)∗∗ (0.401)∗∗ (0.625)∗∗ (9.94)∗∗ (0.0210)∗∗
From the estimation of this probit model, I save the computed conditional probability of
an overlapping order at 9:25AM (the Inverse Mill’s Ratio) for each security i and trading day
t as IMRit. This variable provides a very good indication about whether or not there will be
an opening trade and is used as an explanatory variable in my subsequent analysis of RRT
participation and RRT proﬁts at the market opening.
Table 10 reports the estimation results. As expected, the probability of an overlapping
order at 9:25AM rises with the size of the overnight price change and the average daily dol-
lar trading volume of the security. For the regression involving all ﬁrms and for regressions
involving quintiles 1,2,and 4, NYSE-interlisted stocks are signiﬁcantly less likely to have an
overlapping order at 9:25AM than a non-interlisted stock with the same average daily dol-
lar trading volume. In contrast, for the regression involving all ﬁrms and for most quintile
regressions, AMEX- and Nasdaq-interlisted stocks are signiﬁcantly more likely to have an
overlapping order at 9:25AM than a non-interlisted stock with the same average daily dollar
trading volume. The differences between NYSE- and Nasdaq-interlisted stocks can be ex-
plained by the relative levels of pre-trade market transparency on the NYSE and the Nasdaq.
30The less transparent NYSE opening call auction attracts order ﬂow from informed traders
who do not want to reveal their information in the highly transparent TSE pre-opening ses-
sion. As a result, the TSE opening price will tend to be less efﬁcient, causing liquidity based
trades to either be sent to the NYSE or to wait until after differences between the TSE opening
price and the NYSE opening price are resolved. Because the Nasdaq pre-trade period is more
transparent, the same incentives do not exist. The results for AMEX-interlisted stocks are a
bit puzzling. Because both the NYSE and AMEX use a non-transparent opening call auction,
I would expect them to have similar results. The observed difference may just be an artifact
of the relatively small number of AMEX-interlisted ﬁrms or it may be due to other differences
in the characteristics of ﬁrms that choose to list on the AMEX instead of the NYSE.
In addition to the probability of an opening trade, the RRT’s decision to participate in the
market opening might be motivated by the following factors:
1. Desire to moderate overnight price changes: The performance of RRTs is evalu-
ated, in part, on their ability to maintain price stability. To promote price stability, I
expect that the RRT attempts to moderate overnight price changes by assuming an off-
setting opening position. In general, I expect the probability of RRT participation to
increase with the size of the overnight price change.
2. Competitive response to the presence of competing U.S. market makers and
alternative opening mechanisms: In order to attract order ﬂow away from U.S. ex-
changes, the RRT may increase participation at the open for interlisted stocks in an
attempt to moderate price volatility and improve liquidity. This effect is not clear, how-
ever. In a study of interlisted stocks on the NYSE, Bacidore and Soﬁanos (2000) ﬁnd that
the NYSE specialist actuals participates less actively during regular trading hours for
Canadian-based stocks compared with similar U.S.-based stocks. The RRT may reduce
participation in interlisted stocks if information revelation and price discovery tends to
occur on another exchange.
3. Composition of order ﬂow: The RRT may be more likely to participate at the market
opening when the composition of opening order ﬂow contains more liquidity-motivated
trades. As explained previously, non-client, inventory account orders provide a good
proxy for the level of institutional trade in a security. On the one hand, large institu-
tional orders may create opening imbalances that the RRT can proﬁtably take advantage
of. On the other hand, the RRT may be less likely to participate if institutional trading
31corresponds to a higher level of informed trade. Adverse selection concerns are generally
higher for less widely-held, smaller ﬁrms.
4. Index option expiration days: On the expiration of index-based option and futures
contracts, traders normally purchase an offsetting quantity of the underlying securities
using the MBF order described earlier. On the one hand, large volumes and possible
order imbalances on expiration days may result in higher levels of RRT participation.
On the other hand, large volumes may result in a more “accurate” price and thereby
reduce the need for RRT participation.
The role of each of these incentives is estimated using the probit model:
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i , DV oli, and IMRit are as
deﬁned before and:
1. PARTICit equals one if the RRT participated in a board lot trade at the market open;
equals zero otherwise. I restrict attention here to board lot trades in order to identify
the factors contributing to voluntary RRT participation at the open. In the absence of
order ﬂow data, the RRT’s involvement in an opening trade provides a reasonable proxy
for the RRT’s decision to participate in the pre-opening session. This is because the RRT
is likely only to submit orders with a high probability of execution.
2. Dex
it is a dummy variable that equals 1 on index expiration days for stocks included in
the TSE 35 Composite Index; 0 otherwise. Because only large stocks are included in
the TSE 35 Composite Index, the dummy variable is only included in the regression
involving all ﬁrms and the regression for quintile 1.
3. INVit indicates the net total dollar volume (number of shares purchased minus number
of shares sold) of all trades for stock i on trading day t − 1 involving the RRT.
4. Institit indicates the percentage of opening trade volume, excluding RRT trade volume,
on trading day t for stock i involving a non-client order for an inventory account.
The probit model is estimated for all stocks and across each size quintile. Table 11 reports the
estimation results. I ﬁnd that the probability of RRT participation at the open:
• Rises with the size of the overnight price change;
32Table 11: Estimation results: Probit model of voluntary RRT participation at the
market opening. Standard errors are reported below the coefﬁcient estimates in parenthe-
sis. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated by * and **, respectively.
LLF denotes the value of the log likelihood function. Number of observations: All: 57375; Q1:
11375; Q2–Q5: 11500.
Size Quintile
All Firms Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Dex 0.294 0.225 — — — —
(0.0935)∗∗ (0.0929)∗
|∆P| 0.103 0.114 0.143 0.134 0.128 0.141
(0.00457)∗∗ (0.0117)∗∗ (0.0111)∗∗ (0.0109)∗∗ (0.0101)∗∗ (0.00979)∗∗
|INV | 0.166 0.0583 0.173 0.344 0.775 0.830
(0.00746)∗∗ (0.00830)∗∗ (0.0210)∗∗ (0.0391)∗∗ (0.0783)∗∗ (0.0928)∗∗
Instit 0.168 0.123 0.0660 0.0508 0.0604 0.0937
(0.0181)∗∗ (0.0295)∗∗ (0.0356)∗ (0.0470)∗ (0.532) (0.0404)∗
DV ol 0.367 0.111 1.86 3.75 5.84 4.72
(0.0126)∗∗ (0.0139)∗∗ (0.0982)∗∗ (0.176)∗∗ (0.534)∗∗ (0.458)∗∗
(Dny · DV ol) -0.243 -0.0602 -0.845 -0.309 -5.77 —
(0.0128)∗∗ (0.0132)∗∗ (0.0923)∗∗ (0.816) (0.567)∗∗
(Dnz · DV ol) 0.474 0.411 -1.85 -2.40 3.32 4.79
(0.0410)∗∗ (0.0436)∗∗ (0.173)∗∗ (0.274)∗∗ (0.708)∗∗ (0.759)∗∗
(Dax · DV ol) 0.707 0.498 -0.973 6.06 -2.48 69.5
(0.0502)∗∗ (0.0516)∗∗ (0.259)∗∗ (0.770)∗∗ (0.714)∗∗ (11.7)∗∗
IMR 0.863 0.624 0.935 0.919 0.949 0.937
(0.00969)∗∗ (0.0259)∗∗ (0.0209)∗∗ (0.0221)∗∗ (0.0239)∗∗ (0.0223)∗∗
α0 -1.29 -0.706 -1.42 -1.80 -1.97 -1.84
(0.0105)∗∗ (0.0225)∗∗ (0.0310)∗∗ (0.0328)∗∗ (0.0387)∗∗ (0.0329)∗∗
LLF -23789 -6975 -4996 -3854 -3284 -3441
33• Is signiﬁcantly higher on index expiration days than on regular trading days;
• Is increasing in the share of opening trades involving a non-client, inventory account
order (this suggests that the RRT is often more concerned about taking advantage of
possible order imbalances than the information content of the opening trades);
• Rises with the size of the RRT’s inventory imbalance from the previous trading session.
I also ﬁnd that an RRT assigned to a NYSE-interlisted stock is signiﬁcantly less likely to
participate at the open than an RRT assigned to a non-interlisted stock with the same av-
erage daily trading volume. This result is signiﬁcant across all of the regressions. The less
transparent NYSE opening mechanism increases the RRT’s potential adverse selection costs
and thus appears to make the RRT more hesitant to participate in NYSE-interlisted stocks.
In contrast, I ﬁnd that, for the regression involving all ﬁrms, an RRT assigned to either a
AMEX- or Nasdaq-interlisted stock is signiﬁcantly more likely to participate at the open than
an RRT assigned to a non-interlisted stock with the same average daily trading volume. The
magnitude and sign of this effect, however, varies across the regressions for each quintile.
Again, the results for AMEX-interlisted stocks should be interpreted with caution given the
relatively few AMEX-interlisted stocks in each quintile.
What motivates the direction of RRT trade?: The RRT’s performance is evaluated, in
part, based on whether his/her trades improve price stability. Exchange rule 4-605(1) states
that at least 70% to 80% of RRT trades in their stocks of responsibility shall be stabilizing or
neutral trades. Exchange rule 4-605(2), however, provides an exemption from these stabiliza-
tion requirements for RRTs dealing in all U.S.-based interlisted issues and in those Canadian-
based interlisted issues in which more than 25% of the trading occurred on exchanges in the
U.S. or on Nasdaq in the preceding year. The RRT’s performance impacts whether he/she is
assigned responsibility for more desirable stocks in the future.
The RRT may also use the open as an opportunity to re-adjust any inventory imbalance
from the previous trading day. The high level of market depth at the open provides an ideal
environment to adjust his/her position without unnecessarily disturbing the market. To in-
vestigate how overnight price changes and the RRT’s inventory imbalance impact the RRT’s
net opening trade position, the regression model is estimated:
RTOPENit = α0 + α1∆Pit + α2INVit + α3IMRit + εit (5)
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34Table 12: Factors affecting the direction of RRT opening trades. The regression model
is given by (5), where cross-sectional correlation is allowed for regressions for individual quin-
tiles, but cross-sectional independence is assumed for the regression using all ﬁrms. Standard
errors are reported below the coefﬁcient estimates in parenthesis and statistical signiﬁcance
at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. Number of observations: All:
57375; Q1: 11375; Q2–Q5: 11500.
∆P INV IMR α0 R2
All ﬁrms -8.35 -0.0377 -0.0181 -0.00327 0.011
(0.334)∗∗ (0.00948)∗∗ (0.0109) (0.00712)
Quintile 1 -10.96 -0.0466 -0.0557 0.00977 0.11
(0.301)∗∗ (0.00468)∗∗ (0.0121)∗∗ (0.00794)
Quintile 2 -18.87 -0.420 -0.258 0.0344 0.20
(0.430)∗∗ (0.0210)∗∗ (0.0123)∗∗ (0.00975)∗∗
Quintile 3 -38.4 0.376 0.0587 0.135 0.26
(0.602)∗∗ (0.0721)∗∗ (0.0169)∗∗ (0.0146)∗∗
Quintile 4 -15.2 -2.19 0.00593 -0.0210 0.20
(0.306)∗∗ (0.104)∗∗ (0.0128) (0.0103)∗∗
Quintile 5 -26.8 -1.67 -0.478 -0.173 0.23
(0.492)∗∗ (0.186)∗∗ (0.0215)∗∗ (0.0169)∗∗
E(εi,t−1vjt) = 0. The variable RTOPENit denotes the RRT’s net opening position for ﬁrm i
on trading day t as a share of the security’s average daily trading volume (scaled by 100,000).
The variables ∆Pit, INVit, and IMRit are as deﬁned before. A priori, I expect that α1 < 0 if
the RRT is moderating price volatility and α2 < 0 if the RRT uses the open as an opportunity
to re-adjust his inventory position.
I allow for cross-sectional correlation when estimating the model for each quintile. When
estimating the model using the entire sample of ﬁrms, however, I must assume cross-sectional
independence (E(εitεjt) = 0 ∀i 6= j). This assumption is necessary because the total number
of ﬁrms exceeds the number of trading days.
As reported in table 12, the estimate of α1 is signiﬁcant and negative for all regressions.
The estimate of α2 is signiﬁcant and negative for all regressions, except for the quintile 3
regression. From these observations, I conclude that the RRT’s opening trades moderate
overnight price changes and are motivated, in part, by inventory re-adjustment concerns.
35Table 13: Average RRT proﬁts at the market opening and during regular trading
hours. Proﬁts are reported in dollars per trading day. Opening trades include all trades that
occur at the instant the security opens for regular trading (normally at 9:30AM, except when
the opening is delayed).
Size Quintile
5 4 3 2 1
Trades at the market opening 8.52 7.66 16.61 24.51 62.56
Trades during regular trading hours 56.83 56.16 86.66 156.17 385.94
RRT Proﬁts: I now consider whether the RRT’s opening trades are proﬁtable and whether
their proﬁtability is inﬂuenced by the presence of competing U.S. market makers. Because
it is impossible to calculate the RRT’s exact trading proﬁts from the available data, I make
the following assumptions to construct a reasonable estimate. I assume that RRT begins each
trading day with an accumulated position of zero in all stocks of responsibility. Let Ki denote
the number of trades for security i involving the RRT during the trading day. Let nki denote
the number of shares of security i sold (negative values indicate purchases) at trade number
k ∈ [1,Ki] and let Pki denote the corresponding transaction price. I estimate the gross proﬁt








Let I(k) be an indicator function which equals 1 if transaction k occurred at the market open,









Table 13 reports that average RRT proﬁts at the market opening and during regular trad-
ing hours are positive and are increasing in the size of the ﬁrm under responsibility. Opening
trades contribute about one-sixth of the RRT’s daily trading proﬁt. These results imply that
a typical RT responsible for 10 securities (2 from each size quintile) will have gross proﬁts of
about $373,847 a year (over 252 trading days).
To investigate the factors inﬂuencing the proﬁtability of the RRT’s opening trades on a
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it , and DV oli are deﬁned as
before and πO
it indicates the estimate of total proﬁt from the RRT’s opening trades for ﬁrm i
on trading day t using equation (7).
The motivation for this model is as follows. I include the dummy variables for interlisted
stocks in order to establish whether the presence of competing market makers and alterna-
tive opening mechanisms impacts the RRT’s ability to proﬁtably trade. I include the dummy
variable for index expiration days in order to establish if the RRT is able to proﬁtably take ad-
vantage of opening imbalances caused by the large number of MGF orders submitted on index
expiration days. I include the overnight price change variable in order to determine whether
the RRT can take advantage of potential price over-reaction resulting from news released
during the overnight non-trading period. The average daily dollar volume variable captures
the expectation that RRT proﬁts should be increasing in trading activity. The Instit variable
establishes whether or not the RRT proﬁts depend on the level of institutional activity in the
security at the open. Finally, IMR accounts for the simple fact that RRT cannot have trading
proﬁts at the open if there is no opening trade.
I employ the same estimation approach and assumptions about price changes as used in
the previous regression analysis. In particular, cross-sectional correlation is allowed for re-
gressions for individual quintiles, but cross-sectional independence is assumed for the regres-
sion using all ﬁrms. The estimation results reported in table 14 are summarized as follows:
• The magnitude of overnight price changes has a signiﬁcant positive impact on RRT prof-
its at the open across all regressions. Often, when bad (good) news is announced during
the overnight non-trading period, a ﬂood of sell (buy) orders arrives during the pre-
opening session. Without RRT intermediation, this opening imbalance would cause a
price over-reaction at the open. The RRT, recognizing the imbalance, can take an offset-
ting position which will be proﬁtable when the price partially reverts back during the
trading session. In this manner, the RRT moderates price volatility at the open.
• The average daily trading volume has a signiﬁcant positive impact on RRT proﬁts at the
open for all regressions: higher trade volumes lead to higher RRT proﬁts.
• The percentage of opening trade volume involving non-client inventory account orders
is insigniﬁcant for the regression involving all ﬁrms. The quintile regression results
37Table 14: Factors affecting the proﬁtability of RRT opening trades. The regression
model is given by (8), where cross-sectional correlation is allowed for regressions for individ-
ual quintiles, but cross-sectional independence is assumed for the regression using all ﬁrms.
Standard errors are reported below the coefﬁcient estimates in parenthesis and statistical
signiﬁcance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. Number of
observations: All: 57375; Q1: 11375; Q2–Q5: 11500.
Size Quintile
All Firms Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Dex 34.9 499 — — — —
(26.6) (20.8)∗∗
|∆P| 1.82 42.4 10.3 6.60 4.38 3.72
(0.128)∗∗ (0.847)∗∗ (0.223)∗∗ (0.122)∗∗ (0.0793)∗∗ (0.0753)∗∗
Instit 0.769 28.8 -14.3 8.20 -23.1 -8.80
(0.909) (2.49)∗∗ (1.23)∗∗ (0.952)∗∗ (0.826)∗∗ (0.622)∗∗
DV ol 15.0 21.3 21.1 86.6 84.6 92.6
(2.10)∗∗ (2.94)∗∗ (2.62)∗∗ (4.32)∗∗ (5.69)∗∗ (7.33)∗∗
(Dny · DV ol) -1.12 -12.7 -38.0 -105 -56.5 —
(2.96) (2.44)∗∗ (4.60)∗∗ (10.4)∗∗ (8.29)∗∗
(Dnz · DV ol) 17.4 53.3 -13.8 -36.3 40.8 -14.4
(7.54)∗ (5.32)∗∗ (5.19)∗∗ (12.7)∗∗ (29.0) (12.1)
(Dax · DV ol) 36.1 17.8 1.40 -4.18 -289 889
(10.6)∗∗ (7.72)∗ (16.3) (25.5) (48.3)∗∗ (172)∗∗
IMR 6.34 21.6 22.9 16.6 12.5 9.57
(0.277)∗∗ (1.12)∗∗ (0.402)∗∗ (0.256)∗∗ (0.196)∗∗ (0.209)∗∗
α0 1.73 -20.1 12.3 -0.773 -0.142 -0.361
(0.248)∗∗ (1.81)∗∗ (0.745)∗∗ (0.256)∗∗ (0.203) (0.245)∗∗
R2 0.015 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.27
38suggest that institutional trade has a non-linear impact on RRT proﬁts at the open. For
ﬁrms in quintiles 1 and 3, institutional trade has a signiﬁcant, positive impact on RRT
proﬁts. RRTs responsible for larger ﬁrms are able to take advantage of order imbalances
resulting from larger institutional trades. For ﬁrms in quintiles 2, 4, and 5, institutional
trade has a signiﬁcant, negative impact on RRT proﬁts. RRTs responsible for smaller
ﬁrms appear to be negatively affected by the higher adverse selection costs associated
with institutional trade.
• The dummy variable for index expiration days is signiﬁcant for the quintile 1 regression,
but insigniﬁcant for the regression involving all ﬁrms. The lack of signiﬁcance for the
regression involving all ﬁrms may be due to the less complex speciﬁcation of the error
term. The quintile 1 regression suggests that index expiration days have a signiﬁcant,
positive impact of about $500 to RRT proﬁts from opening trades for stocks listed in the
TSE 35 Composite Index.
• For a given average daily dollar trading volume, RRT proﬁts for NYSE-interlisted stocks
are signiﬁcantly lower for all of the quintile regressions. The same consistent pattern
does not exist for AMEX- and Nasdaq-interlisted stocks. Again, the results for AMEX-
interlisted stocks should be interpreted with caution. In general, these results support
the argument that the less transparent opening call auction of the NYSE contributes to
higher adverse selection costs for the RRT and thereby causes the RRT to participate
less actively and to have lower proﬁts in NYSE-interlisted ﬁrms.
The coefﬁcients for interlisted stocks in the previous regression analysis of RRT proﬁts are
highly sensitive to the regression speciﬁcation. This is because, on a day-to-day basis, RRT
proﬁts in interlisted stocks could be relatively more volatile, with large positive proﬁts some
days and large negative proﬁts other days. Because a linear regression model cannot properly
capture this effect, I now focus on the impact of alternative opening mechanisms on average
RRT opening proﬁts. I estimate the OLS regression model
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i , and DV oli are as deﬁned previously, ¯ πO
i denotes the average proﬁt of
RRT opening trades for security i, and V olatilei is proportional to the variance of returns
based on daily closing prices for security i during 1997 (obtained from Datastream).
Table 15 reports the estimation results. The estimated coefﬁcients for the historic price
volatility and for the average daily dollar trading volume of Nasdaq- and AMEX-interlisted
39Table 15: Regression results: Factors inﬂuencing average RRT proﬁts from opening
trades. Reported standard errors are based on a heteroskedasticitity-consistent covariance
matrix and are reported below the coefﬁcient estimates in parenthesis. Statistical signiﬁcance
at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. Number of observations: 459.
DV ol (Dny · DV ol) (Dnz · DV ol) (Dax · DV ol) V olatile α0 R2
48.5 -28.1 71.6 0.688 -3.37 11.5 0.33
(8.24)∗∗ (9.36)∗∗ (77.6) (20.8) (147) (3.77)∗∗
stocks are statistically insigniﬁcant from zero. As expected, RRT proﬁts are increasing in
average daily dollar trading volume. Also, RRT proﬁts are signiﬁcantly lower for a NYSE-
interlisted stock compared with a non-interlisted stock with the same average daily dollar
trading volume. This is consistent with my previous results and with the hypothesis that the
less transparent NYSE opening call auction reduces the RRT’s ability to trade proﬁtably at
the market opening. Speciﬁcally, informed trade tends to be submitted to the less transparent
exchange, thereby reducing the RRT’s informational advantage, and hence the RRT’s ability
to exploit proﬁtably this information. As well, over time, the more efﬁcient NYSE opening
price attracts order ﬂow to the NYSE, reducing the probability of a TSE-based opening trade
for NYSE-interlisted stocks, and thereby reducing the RRT’s potential to capture proﬁts in
these stocks.
Sensitivity analysis: I perform a number of additional regressions to determine how
sensitive these results are to the model speciﬁcation. First, I explore various speciﬁcations of
the interlisted ﬁrm dummy variables. A large number of interlisted ﬁrms only actively trade
on one exchange. To focus on stocks with liquid markets both in the U.S. and Canada, the re-
gression analysis was repeated using dummy variables for interlisted ﬁrms with between 33%
and 66% of their total order ﬂow on a U.S. exchange. These estimation results were consistent
with the results presented here. I also consider models that substitute the Instit variable
with a variable that is deﬁned as the percentage of RRT trades for which the counterparty to
the trade involved a non-client inventory account order. Similar results were obtained.
Price efﬁciency gain from RRT trade: The combination of two observations suggest that
RRT participation improves the efﬁciency of the opening price: (i) the RRT’s opening trades
tend to be proﬁtable; (ii) the RRT trades against the direction of overnight price changes.
Since RRT trades generally tend to be small, I would like to establish whether or not RRT
opening trades have an economically meaningful effect on price efﬁciency. To quantify this
effect, it is necessary to estimate the impact of RRT trades on the opening price. This is a
40Table 16: Price efﬁciency gain from RRT opening trade. A price efﬁciency gain (loss)
from RRT trade is indicated by a variance ratio (V R) less (greater) than one. The number of
ﬁrms that have variance ratios statistically different from one at the 0.05 conﬁdence level is
indicated in parenthesis.
Efﬁciency Gain (V R < 1) Efﬁciency Loss (V R > 1)
Size Quintile No. of Firms No. Signif. No. of Firms No. Signif.
1 86 (0) 5 (0)
2 89 (5) 3 (0)
3 90 (6) 2 (0)
4 89 (13) 3 (0)
5 89 (19) 3 (1)
difﬁcult problem. Even if I had complete order ﬂow data, it would be impossible to determine
how market participants would have traded in the absence of RRT trade.
To estimate the potential efﬁciency gain from RRT participation, I perform the following
“back-of-the-hand” calculation. I assume that the larger the percentage of opening trade in-
volving the RRT, the larger the price impact of RRT trades. Speciﬁcally, I suppose that when
net RRT opening trades account for less than 25% of opening trade volume, the RRT has no
impact on the opening price; when net RRT opening trades account for between 25%-50% of
opening trade volume, the RRT has an impact on the opening price equal to two tick-sizes
($0.10) in the net direction of his/her trades; and when net RRT opening trades account for
between 50%-100% of opening trade volume, the RRT has an impact on the opening price
equal to four tick-sizes ($0.20) in the net direction of his/her trades. Then, for each ﬁrm, I











where Pf is the 11:00AM price based on the midpoint of the posted bid and ask prices; P0
is the observed opening price; and P∗ is the estimated opening price in the absence of RRT
trade. The results are reported in table 16. The basic pattern is robust to using different
times of day to calculate Pf and to using more or less conservative estimates of the impact
of RRT trades. Although almost all ﬁrms exhibit a price efﬁciency gain from RRT trade,
the gain is statistically signiﬁcant for only 43 of 459 ﬁrms. As expected, more smaller ﬁrms
have statistically signiﬁcant price efﬁciency gains from RRT trade than larger ﬁrms. From
these results, I conclude that the RRT’s contribution to opening price efﬁciency is positive, but
economically and statistically “small”. RRT participation is more important for improving the
41opening price efﬁciency of smaller ﬁrms. It is important to note that these estimates are
meant only to be illustrative and will tend to understate the potentially important role of the
RRT during extremely volatile market conditions.
6 Conclusion
Prior to this study, the role of a market maker, such as the RRT, in the opening price discov-
ery process of a highly transparent ﬁnancial market was not well understood. The detailed
transactions database for the TSE provides an ideal opportunity to examine this environment.
Unlike the NYSE specialist, the RRT cannot set the opening price directly and does not
have exclusive knowledge of the limit order book. Despite this, I demonstrate that the RRT
actively participates in the TSE’s pre-opening session. I show that the RRT’s opening trades
are proﬁtable, tend to moderate overnight price changes and may be motivated in part, by a
desire to rebalance his/her inventory.
I investigate RRT trade in interlisted stocks that simultaneously open on different ex-
changes using different opening mechanisms. I argue that the less transparent NYSE open-
ing call auction contributes to higher adverse selection costs for RRTs assigned to NYSE-
interlisted stocks. As a result, these RRTs participate less actively and have lower proﬁts
at the market opening. In contrast, the more transparent Nasdaq pre-trade period does not
create the same adverse selection costs for RRTs assigned to Nasdaq-interlisted stocks.
I also highlight some of the shortcomings of the TSE’s pre-opening session that may con-
tribute to the observed relatively low levels of liquidity at the TSE market opening in com-
parison with levels on the NYSE and Nasdaq. In particular, poor incentives for early order
submission cause quote revisions to be concentrated in the ﬁnal minutes of the session. This
creates disadvantages to market participants with limited access to trading facilities. It also
results in pre-opening quotes with little ﬁnancial backing that can be easily manipulated.
These problems have prompted new initiatives by the TSE to examine whether the efﬁ-
ciency of its opening mechanism can be improved. In particular, the TSE has entered into an
agreement with OptiMark Technologies, Inc. to replace the pre-opening session with a new
electronic opening call auction. I provide valuable insights into which features of the existing
pre-opening session can be improved. More generally, this paper contributes to the new, and
expanding, literature on what characteristics of pre-opening sessions and opening protocols
efﬁciently facilitate price discovery after the overnight non-trading period.
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